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The Right To Die: Definitional Inquiry
and the Search for Truth
Bryan A. Kelley*
Truth hath a quiet breastI
The quest for definition is, at its most fundamental level, a search for
truth. Ideally, truth is timeless and constant, independent of fickle social
change. More recently this notion of truth has blurred into that which is le-
gally admissible, that which is factually not wrong. Now the quest looks
backward, like a moral spell-checker, rather than forward to find the truth. In
this era of television waves and sound bites, it is easy to become a receptor
of information instead of a seeker. Yet, even a temporal kind of truth can
serve an important role in society's pursuit of longer-lasting definition. In le-
gal debates rife with rhetoric and subjective viewpoints, eliminating polarized
definitions of key terms and creating more neutral objective meanings effec-
tively encourages settlement. 2 While such definitions may not bind future de-
bates, the compromised meaning of a certain term reached over many dis-
putes may itself create a pattern and assist in uncovering the elusive absolute
definition. Such a definition, narrowed bit by bit, will discourage future dis-
putes.3 In no field is this need more apparent than medical ethics, in which a
particular classification is more than mere semantics, but a matter of life or
death.
This article explores the significant advantages of ADR techniques when
dealing with elusive definitions in medical ethics. Part I briefly explores the
meaning of definitional inquiry and justifies its important role in debate and
achieving truth.4 Part II illustrates how confusion associated with certain
terms leads to faulty reasoning, even in a recent Supreme Court decision.5 In
Part III, some governmental sources of this confusion are revealed.6 Part IV
illustrates the common use of rhetoric in the right-to-die debate as an appeal
* B-A. (Vanderbilt), J.D. candidate 2002 (Pepperdine). The author would like to thank Mark
J. Bliton, Ph.D., Center for Clinical and Research Ethics (Vanderbilt Medical Center), and his
family for their continued support.
1. Wn..iAm SHAKEsPEARE. THE TRAGEDY OF RICHARD IL act 1, sc. 3.
2. KimBERT.e K KOVACH. MEDIATION: PRINCInmLE AND PRAcncE 139 (2d ed. 2000).
3. See generally THoMAS E. CARBONNEAU. ALrmRNAT I DispurE REsounoN- MELTING THE
LANcEs AND Dis.mou G TmE STEEDS (1989).
4. See infra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
5. See infta notes 30-47 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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to emotion, rather than true meaning.7 Part V attempts to illustrate why this
problem greatly affects the medical field, and will recount major technologi-
cal developments that have accelerated the field beyond the advances of its
ethical limits.8 Parts VP and VII10 explain the differences in medical and le-
gal definitions of death. Part VIII" illustrates how the standard advantages of
ADR apply to this problem. Parts IX-XI' 2 will explain how ADR can elimi-
nate confusion, discuss the application of ADR to definitional inquiry, and
explain how mediation can integrate the input of the medical, legal, and so-
cial communities into a better definition. Lastly, Part XII' 3 explores whether
an elusive win-win outcome is possible.
I. THE SEARCH FOR DEFINITION
Perhaps no single person stressed the importance of an exact definition
more than the Ancient Greek philosopher Socrates.14 According to his teach-
ings, "if [one] couldn't define something with unvarying comprehensiveness,
then [one] didn't really know what it was."' 5 While his lasting contributions
to philosophy are undeniable, the Socratic Method he invented is virtually
useless in the positive construction of definition - it serves merely to dis-
prove established beliefs.' 6 In fact, his staunch, skeptical pursuit of pure defi-
nition often led to absurd and frustrating results.17 Such failure can be seen in
the search for the definition of wisdom in Plato's Charmides, when Critias re-
marks, "Wisdom alone is a science of other sciences and of itself. And of
this, as I believe, you are very well aware, and you are only doing what you
denied that you were doing just now, trying to refute me, instead of pursuing
7. See infra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 108-133 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
14. ARISTOTLE. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISrOnTE 48 (Renford Bambrough ed., Mentor Books
1963).
15. I.F. STONE. im TRIAL OF SOCRATES 68 (spec. ed. 1994).
16. Id. at 70 (stating that Socrates admittedly never found any of the definitions that he
sought).
17. See STONE, supra note 15, at 69; see also, PLATO. THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO 99 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton University Press 1961). In the di-
alogue Charmides, Socrates "shows himself a master of quibbling ... enough to . . . [irritate]
the reader, and to leave him after pages of hairsplitting definitions with very little idea of what
all the talk has been about." Id.
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the argument."' 8
The need for exact definition, so important in philosophy 2400 years
ago, remains wanting in the legal battles of today. In our modem adversarial
system, "It is important to rid arguments of ambiguities, to focus clearly on
the actual subject under discussion, so that opposing sides [can] avoid the
trap of actually talking about two different things. . .. "19 Finding this com-
mon ground is an essential tool in the negotiation of disputes.20 By framing a
term in a neutral manner, parties tend to de-polarize their views and approach
the dispute in a positive manner.21 However, some terms cannot easily be
construed without the acceptance of presupposed concepts.2 Without such an
underlying framework, the definition loses shape.23 It is here that the right-to-
die debate, rich in political and religious rhetoric, incurs fundamental
turmoil. 24
At first blush, the need for an exact definition may seem little more than
an exercise in semantics. After all, one may argue, the focus in the right-to-
die debate is procedural (what to do with the patient) and not merely substan-
tive (how to define the patient's condition). 25 In a pragmatic world of ever-
changing mores, the argument might follow, a precisely defined classification
holds a temporal importance analogous to the latest fashion trend. To illus-
trate the weakness in this view, one need only consider several 1993 national
opinion polls concerning end-of-life decisions.26
These surveys asked respondents to decide whether they would continue
18. PLArO supra, note 17, at 112.
19. SroNE. supra note 15, at 69.
20. See Wanmt.t URY. GzrmNG PAST No 44 (1991). "It is hard to attack someone who
agrees with you." Id
21. See generally KovAcH. supra note 2, at 139. Diction is one of the most effective meth-
ods a mediator can use, specifically by identifying, refraining, and restating an issue in neutral
terms. d at 138-41.
22. See KAREN GRANOSRAD Gvats. REDEtiNING D.Am 1 (1986).
23. See id In establishing criteria for death it is essential to justify the inclusion of each
aspect in the underlying framework, otherwise the definition is open to attack. Id
24. For an in-depth discussion of right-to-die rhetoric surrounding Washington Initiative
119, see generally, Andrew M. Jacobs, The Right To Die Movement in Washington: Rhetoric and
the Creation of Rights, 36 How. L.J. 185 (1993).
25. See BARRY R. FURRow Er At.. Biomcs: HEALTM CARE LAw AND ETmcs 209 (1997)
(explaining how substantive inquiry for defimition often is lost in the procedural scheme).
26. Adam A. Milani, Better Off Dead than Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a
"Wrngful Living" Cause of Action When Doctors Fail to Honor Patients' Advance Directives?.,
54 WAsI. & LEE L REV. 149, 164 (1997).
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medical treatment if comatose and maintained on a life-support system.27 The
results show a significant correlation between the language used to describe
the condition and the respondents' willingness to remove support. When told
that the diagnosis entailed "no hope of recovering," ".a coma with no brain
activity," or the respondents were left "terminally ill or in irreversible coma"
between seventy-three percent (73%) and eight-five percent (85%) opted to
end treatment and chose death.28 If the condition rendered them "totally de-
pendent on a family member or other person for all their care," fifty-one per-
cent (51%) chose to have life-support removed. 29 When one considers that in
both situations the respondent is hypothetically comatose and on life-support,
and the gravity involved in the resulting life or death decision, diction and
definition played a role in this survey beyond superficial semantics. When a
minor change in terms would lead twenty-five to thirty percent of those re-
sponding to opt for their own death, the importance of phrasing and seman-
tics is clearly magnified.
Why did the respondents depend so greatly upon the phrasing of very
similar diagnoses? Perhaps one explanation is that words do not merely fore-
cast the condition, but rather, words become the condition. Since the internal
condition of the comatose patient is essentially a mystery, a doctor's interpre-
tation labels the patient. In effect, these mere words are much more than a
verbal translation of a readily observable phenomenon. They entail deeper so-
cial, medical, and legal implications, as this next section shows.
IX. THE SUICIDE/HOMICIDE DILEMMA
Consider a second example of the need for exact definition in the right-
to-die debate: Justice Antonin Scalia's concurrence in the 1990 case Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health.30 Nancy Cruzan remained in a
"persistent vegetative state" after a serious car accident. 31 She suffered exten-
sive brain damage, deprived of oxygen for twelve to fourteen minutes before
medics arrived on the scene.32 When informed that their daughter possessed
virtually no hope of recovery, Nancy's parents asked the hospital to discon-
27. Id. Overall, the majority of those asked wished to discontinue treatment if comatose or
terminally ill. Id.
28. Id.
29. lId
30. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
31. Id. at 266. The Court defines "persistent vegetative state" (or "PVS") as "generally, a
condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cog-
nitive function." Id.
32. Id. Brain damage generally occurs after six minutes of total oxygen deprivation. Id.
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tinue her life support3 3 Because of a Missouri state statute requiring clear and
convincing evidence of the patient's wishes, the doctors refused to do so
without a court order.Y The parents argued that Nancy had expressed her de-
sire to (hypothetically) be removed from life-support once in a casual conver-
sation with a former housemate.35 This argument failed when Supreme Court
upheld the Missouri statute, citing the state's unqualified interest to preserve
human life and the irreversibility of the decision to terminate if proved
erroneous. 6
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia rebuts the three-prong argument put
forth by Cruzan's parents.37 The foray into the second argument illuminates
the loose language so prevalent in the right-to-die debate. Nancy's family ar-
gued that declining treatment would allow her to die naturally, constituting an
inactive rather than active taking of life?6 Here, Justice Scalia gets caught in
a web of semantics and eventually concludes that the distinction between ac-
tivity and inactivity is logically and legally meaningless. 9 He quotes Black-
stone's definition of "suicide" as "one who 'deliberately puts an end to his
own existence, or commits any unlawful malicious act, the consequence of
which is his own death.' "40 Justice Scalia argues that logic and the law can-
not delineate between activity and passivity when it comes to the termination
of life. 41 For instance, in the case that an infant dies of starvation while under
her mother's care, the mother cannot reasonably claim the inactive absence of
feeding as a defense to actively committing homicide.! 2 Legally, he continues,
33. Id. at 267.
34. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268-69. See also Douglas 0. lnder, The Other Right-To-Life
Debate: When Does Fourteenth Amendment "Life" End? 37 ARrL L REv. 1183, 1192 (1995)
(summarizing Cruzan and the due process interests of a PVS patient).
35. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 285. While Nancy specifically stated she would not wish to live
as a "vegetable," the Court found she did not specifically refer to the withdrawal of medical
treatment. Id
36. See id at 282-83.
37. Id at 295. Justice Scalia admits in his dissent, "I would have preferred that we an-
nounce, clearly and promptly, that the federal courts have no business in this field." Id. at 293.
38. Id at 295-96.
39. See id. at 296-97.
40. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294.
41. 1, at 296.
42. Id at 297. This rationale illustrates a substantial flaw in Justice Scalia's response - he
applies suicide to a homicide situation - the termination of Cruzan's life per substituted judg-
ment. He then uses a hypothetical involving homicide (the mother and child) to explain an aspect
of suicide, the distinction between activity and inactivity. The two are not interchangeable.
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this distinction is "merely verbal" when held up to Blackstone's definition, as
both inactivity and activity may enable one to "put[] an end to his own
existence." 43
From the outset, Justice Scalia's argument incorporates a substantial
gaffe in terminology. He bases his entire rebuttal to the second argument
upon the self-inflicted act of suicide. Black's Law Dictionary defines "sui-
cide" as "self-destruction; the deliberate termination of one's existence."' ' In
a substituted judgment scenario, a person other than the patient decides to
discontinue treatment (though theoretically acting with the patient's wishes in
mind). Thus, the patient technically does not end his own existence in a sub-
stituted judgment scenario, but rather death is caused by a joint decision of
family and hospital personnel. The term "suicide" is literally inappropriate
when the patient's wishes are unknown, and the patient's incapacitated state
virtually eliminates any possibility that the patient will act deliberately in
choosing death. The Black's definition continues, "some jurisdictions hold it
to be murder for one person to persuade or aid another to commit suicide." 45
This case involves homicide, as the Supreme Court and Missouri seek to pro-
tect Cruzan from the erroneous termination of her life.
The confusion between suicide and homicide in Justice Scalia's argument
has produced far-reaching effects. In Compassion in Dying v. State of Wash-
ington, the Ninth Circuit held the Due Process Clause necessarily entails a
right to physician-assisted suicide.46 The court justified this extension of the
Fourteenth Amendment, stating, "we see no ethical or constitutionally cogni-
zable difference between a doctor's pulling the plug on a respirator and his
prescribing drugs which will permit a terminally ill patient to end his own
life."'47 According to this reasoning, quite reminiscent of Scalia's concurrence
in Cruzan, homicide (the doctor actively removing the respirator) is by legal
definition the same as suicide (a patient using drugs to end his own life).
Again, suicide and homicide blur to the extent that inactivity and activity be-
come logically and legally meaningless. The court ignores the identity of the
43. Id. at 296-97. "The omission is permitted, the act forbidden, the consequence - death -
the same." See RICHARD A. POSNER. THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 128
(1999).
44. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (5th ed. 1979).
45. d [emphasis added].
46. See Compassion in Dying v. State of WA, 49 F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir. 1995). For a gen-
eral discussion of the impact of this case within the right-to-die debate, see Milani, supra note
26, at 160-61.
47. See Milani, supra note 26, at 161 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 815-16).
In Quill v. Vacco, a federal court held that the right-to-die did not necessarily entail a right to
assisted suicide, but did so avoiding the definitional issue completely. See id. at 161-62 (citing
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1995).
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actor, the victim, and the inherent nature of the act itself - essentially elimi-
nating the characteristics that set the two disparate acts apart.
IM DEiNMoN AND THE RIGHT To DIE
Despite its unintentional illustration of the confusion in this field, the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the lack of definition in the right-to-die de-
bate presents enormous problems.48 Judge Noonan, speaking for the majority,
wrote, "a definition of the terminally ill [cannot] be supplied from the Wash-
ington statute on the refusal of life-sustaining treatment. . . There are three
difficulties: [the considerable variation in definition of terms between states],
[l]ife itself is a terminal condition, [and a terminal illness classification can
vary with time]." 49
This Washington statute presents the little guidance that "legalese" defi-
nitions bestow.50 The Washington statute defines "life-sustaining treatment"
as "any medical or surgical intervention . . . including artificially provided
nutrition and hydration . . . which when applied . . . would serve only to
prolong the process of dying." 5' Thus, inexplicably, in Washington life-
sustaining treatment prolongs death. The patient remains in the prior state yet
suspends in the latter, lost somewhere in between the two.Y
IV. RHETORIC AS A DEFINMON-AVOIDING TOOL
In 1991, supporters of the right-to-die movement in Washington State in-
troduced Initiative 119 to the ballot, a measure that guaranteed the enforce-
ment of living wills and the right to physician-assisted suicide.5 3 In the
months before the election, advocates and opponents of the bill battled for
support, using rhetorical devices to polarize the issue.54 Though the measure
eventually failed,55 this linguistic battle illustrates that while rhetoric appeals
48. See Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 593.
49. See id.
50. See generally WAsH. REv. CODE § 70.122.020 (1999).
51. Id. at § 70.122.020(5).
52. The confusion between these two terms extends far beyond the state of Vashington. In
general, "'vitalists" (those that protect life from termination) have failed to distinguish between
sustaining life and death prolonging. See JoHN KLEtNG. VALUING LtFE 220 (1991).
53. Jacobs, supra note 24, at 187-88.
54. See id at 189.
55. See id. Jacobs claims the highly publicized assisted-suicides by Dr. Jack Kevorkian and
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strongly to emotions, definitional limits are needed lest the right-to-die debate
run amok.
Supporters of Initiative 119 used rhetoric to frame the debate as a matter
of personal choice.56 By publicizing the sentiments of terminally ill patients,
proponents attempted an appeal to authority.57 Some groups bootstrapped the
right-to-die debate to abortion rhetoric, especially because Initiative 120, the
next vote on the ballot, attempted to codify Roe v. Wade.58 In another strat-
egy, supporters used a television campaign portraying the viewer in a situa-
tion in which a loved-one was terminally ill and on life-support, essentially
"constructing problems to justify solutions. ' 59 This tactic borrowed the grue-
some consequence-oriented rhetoric of gay-rights supporters protesting "gay
bashing" and anti-homosexual violence.60 Finally, supporters appealed to re-
ligious faith, testing the voters' convictions. Reverend Dale Turner told fel-
low-advocates, "God has given to each of us free will and intellectual powers
to enable us to make life's choices." 6'
Those opposing Initiative 119 couched the debate in terms of strict relig-
ious and legal interpretation. 62 Touting "Thou shalt not kill" and "[euthana-
sia] is plain old homicide, ' 63 opponents of 119 portrayed the Initiative as old
wine in a new bottle. 64 Local religious leaders portrayed medically assisted
suicide as "break[ing] the covenant of life which God has shared with us."65
These tactics exemplify in-group rhetoric, defining issues in terms of a
group's shared conception.66 Accordingly, opponents argued that man should
the suicide of Hemlock Society leader Derek Humphry's wife shortly before the vote played a
large part in the failure of 119. See id. at 211.
56. Id. at 189.
57. See id at 189-90 (quoting Pat Nugent, a cancer patient, who stated, "No one has the
right to deny me that choice," in Initiative 119-Should Aid-in-Dying Be Allowed? Yes., S'ATrLi
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, at A21).
58. Jacobs, supra note 24, at 190.
59. See id. at 191 (citing MURRAY EDELMAN. CONSTRUCTING THE POLTCAL SPECTICAL 21-
23 (1998)).
60. Jacobs, supra note 24, at 191.
61. Id. at 192-93 (citing Dale Turner, A Wise Plan: God Gives Us Free Will to Make
Choices, Including Act of Dying, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, at C9).
62. Id. at 194.
63. Id. at 196 (quoting Susan Loveberg, Grayest County Wrestles with 119; 'Death with
Dignity' Initiative is Very Real to Rural Senior Citizens, SEATrLE TIME.S, Oct. 25, 1991).
64. See Jacobs, supra note 24, at 194-96. Religious groups spent nearly $500,000 on ad-
vertising to defeat 119 and 120. Id at 195.
65. See id. at 195 (citing Charles E. Brown, Initiative 119, 120 Denounced in Mass by
Archbishop Murphy, SEATn.F TimES, Oct. 7, 1991).
66. Jacobs, supra note 24, at 198.
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work within God's plan rather than hubristically take control and play God.67
Both constituents used pathos rhetoric in an effort to inflame the emo-
tions of the voting public.6s In reality, the fear of a compassionate system
without controls may have turned the tide against Initiative 119P Best said,
"[those for euthanasia] claim that slopes are only as slippery as you make
them, that skilled and sensitive skiers can stop even on steep slopes. . .. -"
Clearly, the public was not ready to extend this trust. More interesting, how-
ever, is the polarization of the issue that took place. Though the opponents of
Initiative 119 prevailed, when the smoke cleared no one was the wiser as to
what the debate was truly about.7'
V. THE PREcIPrrous DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY
The confusion that surrounds the right-to-die debate is hardly novel. For
thousands of years, people have struggled with ways to appropriately define
various aspects of the dying process n In Socrates' time, the inquiry was pri-
marily philosophical because life expectancy was short, and the medical com-
munity did little more than obey the first tenet of the Hippocratic Oath:
"First of all, do no harm." 73 In Plato's Pheado, Socrates describes the An-
cient Greek metaphysical concept of death:74
[Socrates:] Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?
[Simmias:] Most certainly ...
[Socrates:] Is it simply the release of the soul from the body? Is death nothing more
or less than this, the separate condition of the body by itself when it is released from the
soul, and the separate condition by itself of the soul when released from the body? Is
death anything else than this?
67. See id. at 197.
68. For an in-depth discussion of the evolution in classical rhetoric, see generally Michael
Frost, Introduction to Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL lmDns. LU. 613
(1999). There are three types of arguments: those based on logic (logos), emotion (pathos), and
the credibility of the advocate (ethos). Id at 619.
69. Jacobs, supra note 24, at 199-200.
70. KLENG. supra note 52, at 216.
71. See Jacobs, supra note 24, at 212-13.
72. See generally PLATo. supra note 17, at 39-88 (Socrates discusses death shortly before
his execution). See also GElvAts. supra note 22, at 6-14 (explaining the problems in the attempt
to medically and legally define death).
73. See FuRRow. supra note 25, at 209. The doctor owes a "'negative [duty] of
nonmaleficience" to the patient. Id.
74. PLATo. supra note 17, at 47.
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[Simmias:] No, just that.
In the last century, medical technology has advanced so drastically that it
is now possible to artificially extenuate human life beyond its so-called "nat-
ural limits."'75 While the notion of delaying bodily "death" perhaps seemed
far-fetched in Socrates' day, artificial life-support is today a common option
in medical protocol. 76 The explosion of this topic, and consequently the lack
of preparation of the legal, ethical, social, and medical communities when
dealing with terms within the debate, parallels the exponential development in
medical technology in the last half-century.
For instance, according to Plato, Socrates' cohorts knew he was dead
when he turned cold and failed to respond to his bailiff's questions. 77 In our
country, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 78 understood that "per-
sonhood" ended when the heart and lungs stopped working, presumably re-
sulting in the individual turning cold and no longer breathing.79 Thus, in a
span of over 2100 years, the medical community had made virtually no
change to this standard. Death meant lack of blood and oxygen flow.
During the last half of the twentieth century, the medical community
made significant developments in both practice and hospital procedure.80 In
1939, an estimated thirty-seven percent (37%) of the American population
died in hospitals or nursing homes."' In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the
iron lung and positive-pressure respirators were developed and became com-
mon modes of treatment.82 In 1960, cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR")
was introduced as an emergency procedure for treating cardiac arrest, and
soon became standard for all patients suffering from heart failure.83 The com-
mon trend in these examples is that fringe techniques for saving life in spe-
cific emergency situations have become default treatments. Partially due to
these developments in life-saving procedures, the percentage of Americans
who died in hospitals or nursing homes in the 1980s swelled to over eighty
percent (80%).8 The result is a crisis: more and more patients are dying in
75. Milani, supra note 26, at 158 (citing California's Natural Death Act of 1976).
76. See id. at 151-52.
77. See PLATO. supra note 17, at 98. Jacques Louis David depicted this death scene in his
painting, The Death of Socrates.
78. The Fourteenth Amendment states, "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law . U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV § 1.
79. See Linder, supra note 34, at 1188.
80. See Milani, supra note 26, at 151.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 152.
83. Id
84. See id.
10
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hospitals while on life-support.
V. THE BRAIN DEATH STANDARD
As medical progress evolved, so too did the well-established criteria for
death.85 In 1959, two French neurologists proposed a "brain death" standard
over the circulatory and respiratory criteria.8 The 1968 Ad Hoc Committee of
the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death
adopted the term "irreversible coma," commonly considered identical to the
brain death standard.87 The Committee set forth three criteria for determining
brain death: "when a patient exhibits: (1) unreceptivity and unresponsivity;
(2) no movements or breathing; and (3) no reflexes."88 Advances in technol-
ogy have allowed patients devoid of any brain activity to continue breathing
and circulating blood for several days, a phenomenon the medical community
later recognized as "ventilating a corpse."8 9 In a field where blood and oxy-
gen flow once indicated life, the brain death standard has prevailed as a more
practical means for determining death.
The inquiry did not end here, as researchers found that upper and lower
brain death are wholly separate phenomena with particular effects. Upper
brain death takes place when the cerebral cortex ceases to functionY0 With
this phenomenon, "all psychological attributes of personhood - emotion,
awareness of environment, and the ability to entertain thought or experience
pain cease." 91 Though the upper brain is dead, the brain stem may live on,
enabling the patient to "laugh, cry, grimace, yawn, swallow, and open their
eyes." 92 In order to avoid the dilemma of terminating a seemingly alive pa-
tient, a Presidential Commission endorsed a "whole brain death" standard in
1983.93
85. See Linder, supra note 34, at 1183-84. In an amusing display of rhetorical cuphemism.
a government hospital regulation used the term "negative patient care outcome" instead of
"death." See Thomas R. Haggard, The Scrivener, 9 S.C. LAw. 13 (1997).
86. See Linder, supra note 34, at 1184.
87. See GERvAis. supra note 22, at 8.
88. Id.
89. See Linder, supra note 34, at 1184.
90. Id. at 1193.
91. Id.
92. ld.
93. See id The whole brain death standard is far easier to diagnose than upper brain death.
See id. at 1194. For a critical review of the brain death standard, see generally Tom Stacy,
11
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VII. DEFINITION AND LEGAL STATUS
One cannot simply classify a patient medically as "terminally ill" or
"brain dead" without ramifications in other fields; such classifications neces-
sarily affect a patient's legal rights, social standing, and medical priority.94
While a medical definition is diagnostic, a legal definition must be func-
tional.95 Legally, a patient loses rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when "personhood" ends.96 Searching for answers, the legal debate has
focused on constitutional interpretation, calling upon the Framers' intent, the
original text, and applicable case law. 7
Unfortunately, the notion of a comatose patient on life-support was tech-
nologically unthinkable to the drafters.98 As one author wrote, "[o]ne might
as well ask whether framers of the Fourteenth Amendment considered 'per-
sons' to include Martians." 99 This gap has caused many to demand that indi-
vidual states assume the power to choose.100 In her concurrence to the Cruzan
decision, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor called for the Court to grant defer-
ence to "the laboratory of the States."'' In his separate concurrence, Justice
Scalia agreed that the states should have as much say as the Court, writing,
"It is quite impossible (because the Constitution says nothing about the mat-
ter) that those citizens will decide upon a line less lawful than the one we
would choose .. . (because we know no more about 'life and death' than
they do) . ... 2
VII. THE ADVANTAGES OF ADR
The high cost, binding effect, and competitive nature of traditional litiga-
tion make it an inappropriate medium for definitional inquiry. In contrast, the
cooperative negotiations of alternative dispute resolution provide an ideal set-
ting. Cooperation is essential when the parties have common interests, depend
Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 CORNELL L REV. 490 (1992) (adopting a
consciousness standard).
94. See FuRRow, supra note 25, at 208.
95. See id at 180.
96. See Linder, supra note 34, at 1187-88.
97. See id at 1188-89.
98. See id at 1188.
99. Id. at 1198. Looking back, we simply cannot tell whether the Framers would have con-
sidered comatose patients as persons. See id. at 1197.
100. See Linder, supra note 34, at 1196-97.
101. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292.
102. Id. at 293.
296
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upon each other, and share limited resources.' °3 Negotiations potentially lead
to common understanding between the parties and joint-decision making.' °0 In
addition, dispute resolution is generally less expensive, faster, and more pri-
vate than traditional litigation.'05 The results are significantly more stable, as
the parties themselves strike the deal, rather than an adjudicated result that
one party might find wholly unfair.t3 6
Most importantly for definitional inquiry, dispute resolution sets loftier
sights than merely who wins and who loses. Traditional litigation encourages
confrontation and competition, yet dispute resolution teaches civil harmony
and future cooperation. Here the search for truth may flourish. Cooperative
negotiations "strive to accomplish ends that go beyond achieving finality...
[and] transcend the rendering of adjudicatory outcomes that have sufficient le-
gal truthfulness . . . ( ) Adjudication's greater truth and the legal system's
core responsibility as a social process reside in an essential pedagogical mis-
sion."' 7 In the right-to-die debate, there is much to learn.
IX. DEFINITION THROUGH DIsPuTE RESOLUTION
Because opening this power to define will inevitably lead to disparate
definitions amongst the states, a system must exist in which non-binding defi-
nitions may arise.1 0t In order to maintain the integrity of the medical profes-
sion and honor the intentions of the Framers, such definitions cannot be un-
bounded.1 9 For instance, unless one has a family member in a "vegetative"
state, those not in the medical community presumably lack the understanding
to properly conceive of these technical terms." 0 However, the emotional input
of the layperson is clearly essential to the debate. If the social setting is ig-
nored, the definition may prove "inapplicable or cumbersome.""' As previ-
103. See MICHAEL PALMER & StMON ROBERTS. DsPtrm PRocEssEs ADR AND Tim PR~tARY
FORMS OF DECISION MAKING 76 (1998).
104. See i at 18.
105. See i. at 156-57 (quoting Lord Woolf).
106. See i& at 144.
107. CARBoNNAu. supra note 3, at 8.
108. See Linder, supra note 34, at 1196-97. In his Cruzan dissent. Justice Stee=s accuses
the Missouri statute of attempting to define life rather than protect it. See Cnzan. 497 U.S. at
344.
109. See id. at 1197.
110. See id. at 1206.
Ill. Id. at 1201.
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ously stated in Part VII, exactly how this definition is worded can have
profound effects on a patient's legal status and rights, and thus the legal com-
munity must take place in this endeavor as well. Clearly, a classification in
this field presents specific difficulties which can only be solved if lawyers,
doctors, and social groups fully integrate and work together.
The mediation process provides an appropriate setting for the determina-
tion of these elusive definitions, while supplying temporary suggestions en
route to the true definition. In the short term, this definition "is not seen as a
particular 'truth' that cannot be contested, but as a product of communicative
agreement within a particular social context."" 2
X. APPLICATION
By its nature, ADR requires, at minimum, enough initial cooperation be-
tween the parties to reach the bargaining table." 3 Representatives from the le-
gal, medical, and social communities must initially agree to seek ADR and
voluntarily enter the process." 4 While the aforementioned cost of dispute res-
olution for definitional inquiry would be substantially lower than that of liti-
gation, some parties essential to this process may not see the necessity in fi-
nancing this largely philosophical pursuit. Rather, certain social parties opting
for more extreme definitions might rather allocate money to advertising and
perpetuating polarized rhetoric in an effort to win at the voting booths." 5
Thus the question, put bluntly, is why should the groups involved seek com-
promised definition rather than stoically defending their positions?
This idea may at first seem a welcome dose of pragmatism in this ethe-
real exercise. However, it fails to recognize the need that our definitions
themselves need be functional and pragmatic. They are inextricably entwined
with the way we live, the values we hold, and the judgments we pass. Defini-
tion means much more than detached scholarly interpretation. In the realm of
medical ethics, "[e]xisting definitions are intended to fulfill the moral func-
tion of distinguishing between beings that do and do not deserve a right to
life."" 6 While winning a proposition might suffice until next year, honing in
on a more accurate meaning will have a more profound social effect.
112. JuaE MACFARLANE. RETHINKING DIsPurES: THE MEDIATION ALTERNATIVE 317 (1997).
113. "Successful negotiation depends upon a mutual desire to compromise, a willingness
to concede." ROBERT A. WENKE. THE ART OF NEGOTIATING FOR LAWYERS 3 (1985).
114. See STEPHEN PATRICK DOYLE & ROGER SILVE HAYDOCK. WITHOUT THE PUNCHES:
RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LmGATION 19 (1991) (stating that mediation generally begins
when parties agree to seek ADR).
115. See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
116. Stacy, supra note 93, at 500-01.
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Clearly the legal and medical communities stand to benefit most from
this process. While clarity in professional standards is the immediate goal, an-
other desirable outcome is that those in the professional fields limit their per-
sonal liability. As suggested by the aforementioned Washington Revised
Code, current legislation attempting to define such elusive terms as "life-
sustaining" and "death-prolonging" is extremely cryptic." 7 Assuming that the
statute is even intelligible, an attorney's failure to accurately inform the client,
to sue appropriately on the client's behalf, or to prevent unwarranted litigation
might give rise to a malpractice action." 8 Thus, professional factions in the
legal community could use this process to their advantage by seeking to clar-
ify existing law. At the same time, legislators could avoid writing confusing
legalese definitions by incorporating the more pragmatic views of the medical
and social contingents, ideally included in the final settled result. Laws must
be functional, for "[t]o maintain its credibility, the law must accurately reflect
the reality it purports to govern."" 9
Perhaps even more confusing is the role of the doctor when a patient is
described as "terminally ill." Engrained in this phrase is the notion that the
patient has no hope of recovery, and thus opting for normally administered,
life-saving procedures would waste resources. In essence, the patient has lost
his or her rights to these procedures. Because of the significant effects of this
diagnosis, the doctor interpreting the patient's condition is subject to a poten-
tial malpractice claim, much as the lawyer interpreting the law. Additionally,
as Justice O'Connor observed in her concurrence in Cruzan, performing med-
ical treatment against a patient's wishes is not only punishable under tort law,
but also violates the patient's Fourteenth Amendment rights.'2 Scientific defi-
nitions alone cannot clarify this dilemma, nor limit liability. An interpretation
that is solely biological in nature ignores the moral aim of legal and procedu-
117. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
118. See MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CoNDucr. R. 1.4, (2001)(stating "A lawyer shall explain
a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions re-
garding the representation." See also, R. 2.1 cmt. (2001), (suggesting "when a lawyer knows that
a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal conse-
quences to the client, duty. . . may require that the lawyer act. . .
119. Stacy, supra note 93, at 491.
120. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289. "Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Pro-
cess Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject
medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water." lit
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ral medical definitions.'21 In fact, "[plossessed of no real moral relevance, a
purely biological definition thus appears rather useless."' Without these le-
gal and moral components, how can a doctor "do no harm"?
The social community presents the greatest challenge to the success of
this process, as those present may be more inclined to pursue a specific
agenda than make concessions. The selection of an ADR technique is clearly
essential. Mediation encourages communication, cooperation, and combats the
risk that social groups may try to negotiate rather than discuss.123 Mediation
does entail negotiation; however, the negotiation is subject to formal con-
straints. 24 Conversely, pure negotiation inherently involves strategy, conceal-
ment, and deception, and its adversarial nature can impede the goal of uncov-
ering a more exact definition. 25 Arbitration usually applies when
reconciliation is secondary to determining who is right, something that, when
searching for absolute definition, we may never know. 26
XI. DEFINITION THROUGH MEDIATION
Mediation is the key to this process. It is short in duration, closed to the
public, cohesive in structure, controlled by a neutral third party, and most im-
portantly, goal oriented. 27 Unfortunately, of all ADR techniques, voluntary
mediation is commonly refused or ignored. 28 However, parties in this case
may more readily attend given the individual advantages to the medical, legal,
and social communities of achieving more accurate definitions in the realm of
medical ethics. Here the ideal mediator should possess advanced academic
and judicial skills to understand the interaction of law, medicine, and moral-
ity.129 At the outset, the mediator must "build credibility with those in con-
121. See Stacy, supra note 93, at 500.
122. Id. at 501.
123. In the case of divorce, for example, negotiation settles in ninety percent (90%) of
cases, yet may not result in any reconciliation. See STUART S. NAGEL & Miutam K. MiLLS. Sys.
TEMATiC ANALYSIS IN DisPuTE RESOLUTION 6 (1991). "There is usually too much ego involve-
ment for either side to be willing to come to what an outsider would consider a reasonable agree-
ment." Id.
124. See DWIGHT GOLANN. MEDIATING LEGAL Disptnus 516 (1996).
125. "A [skillful negotiator's] sophisticated concession plan may include fictitious issues,
as well as an exaggeration of legitimate issues . . . He must do this without it's being apparent.
If not, his credibility suffers." WENKE. supra note 113, at 14.
126. See NAGEL & MiLLs. supra note 123, at 7.
127. See hL at 46.
128. See id. at 82. Several studies have shown that in community and interpersonal dis-
putes, people refused mediation in 1,898 of 3,911 cases (48%). See id.
129. See GoLAN. supra note 124, at 516. "Often a former judge or senior practitioner will
be available who is recognized and respected as a person of consummate skill and fervent dedi-
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flict by developing their expectations that the mediator and the mediation pro-
cess will help them successfully address the issues in dispute.'" Once the
talks begin, the mediator has the burden of controlling the direction of the
proceedings.' 3'
Overall, the mediator's greatest tasks are to preserve open channels of
communication and diffuse pre-existing hostility. He or she "can [point out]
that trust ... is often restored in mediation by the very nature of the process
and the conduct of the parties as they shift from an adversarial stance to one
of collaboration on a common problem.""3 Among the social contingents, the
risk of impasse is great. For instance, presumably the "religious Right"
would protest vehemently to a definition that allows the euthanasia of a bio-
logically living being. Conversely, right-to-die activists would not concede to
a definition that in application removes significant aspects of patient auton-
omy. The mediator must intervene early in the discussion to prevent polariza-
tion and "hard-line" commitments.133 By refocusing attention to the common
problems that unclear terminology in medical ethics presents, instead of areas
where viewpoints conflict, a skillful mediator can successfully navigate im-
passe without demanding that social groups abandon ardently held beliefs.
XII. A WIN-WIN SITUATION?
Despite the high risk of conflict among social groups, using mediation
for definitional inquiry can result in the ideal win-win outcome. Christopher
Moore enumerates six requirements for a win-win situation.'3 Of the six, this
process clearly satisfies five elements, and arguably satisfies the sixth. Moore
lists that a future relationship must be important, that the stakes for creating a
cation to assisting parties in resolving disputes through mediation." !d
130. NAGEL & MnLs. supra note 123, at 87.
131. See VENE., supra note 113, at 29. "No matter what is on the agenda, an effective
negotiator should take the initiative and seek to gain control of the direction of negotiations." Id.
The mediator's task is to intervene to the extent necessary to move the different factions through
general problem-solving areas and avoid impasse. See CusRnmm W. MooRE THE ME!ATtO
PRoCESS: PRACrcAL STxraoas FOR REsoVLGvNc CoNFJcr 76 (1996).
132. GOLANN, supra note 124, at 518-19. Additionally, the mediator should attempt to
make parties more flexible by pointing out that pooling mediation with seemingly adverse parties
produces at least a more informed result. See id. at 519.
133. See MooRE. supra note 131, at 94. "Polarization often results when disputants fail to
understand productive means or procedures to resolve their controvesy." It.
134. See generally id. at 103-04.
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mutually satisfactory solution are high, and that the interests of the parties are
mutually dependent.' 35 Future cooperation between the legal, medical, and so-
cial communities is not only important, but also essential to the moral and
physical well being of our society. In the balance lies human life; clearly the
stakes are very high. In addition, the great independence of the three parties'
concerns would draw them to voluntarily enter the mediation.
Next, Moore lists that parties must assertively solve problems, and coop-
erate in joint problem solving freely. 136 As previously stated, the medical and
legal communities possess very similar interests in this endeavor. Without the
constraints of professional guidelines, social contingents may also freely par-
ticipate in problem solving.
The sixth element, arguably satisfied, is that parties not be engaged in a
power struggle. 37 While the medical and legal communities seek clarity for
the sake of procedure and limiting liability, the mediator must avert hostility
between social groups. Again, when the mediator recasts the situation as find-
ing the solution to a common problem, rather than a contest of beliefs, the
parties can avoid impasse. Thus, a win-win outcome may occur despite the
diverse nature of the attending parties.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Socrates sought absolute definition in his dialogues because without this
knowledge one could never know a given subject's true meaning. Though he
failed personally in this quest, his method had a very important secondary ef-
fect. When his opponents failed to define conclusively an aspect of their
claimed expertise, they inevitably realized they in fact knew very little al-
though they acted otherwise. This epiphany of ignorance, always in public,
caused embarrassment and harm to their reputation. Patients in the right-to-
die contest pay for this lack of clarity with their lives. The debate needs
structure, something that the Constitution alone cannot provide. Mediation
provides an effective, inexpensive, pragmatic answer to this plague. When
one clears away the rhetoric, and seeks absolute truth through definition,
however slight, the medical, legal, and social communities may step forward
as one. Until then, confusion will hang over this field like a dark cloud, blur-
ring vision.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 104.
137. Id. at 103.
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